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Dr. George C. Edwards III 
Since the legislative branch is responsible for policy-making, the president's 
success at passing policy depends on his ability to persuade Congress. Because 
congressmen are responsive to their constituents, one of the ways presidents can persuade 
Congress is by obtaining public support. In attempts to obtain support, presidents make 
appeals to the American public, otherwise known as "going public, 
" These appeals began 
with Theodore Roosevelt's administration and have been employed more lrequently with 
each successive president. However, the effectiveness of "going public" is highly 
speculative. In this study, I examined four issues about which President Bush went public: 
the Persian Gulf Crisis, War on Drugs, North American Free Trade Agreement, and the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1990. I determined how successful Bush was at going public by 
comparing the hequency of his appeals to changes in public opinion. The results show 
that the president's attempts to change public opinion were relatively unsuccessful, except 
for when he addressed the nation as a whole. 
Introduction 
The greatest challenge every president faces is obtaining and maintaining public 
support, Public support is one of the president's most valuable resources because it 
enhances his chances of success with fellow politicians in Washington. With public 
support, the president can more effectively lead the nation by persuading Congress to 
pass his policies. Congress is very responsive to public opinion because its members are 
held accountable by their constituents during elections, Therefore, the key to a 
president's success is his ability to gain public support so that he can persuade Congress 
to pass his policies. This is especially uue under the conditions of divided government 
that characterize contemporary politics. 
Recently, Samuel Kernell theorized that presidents can obtain public support and 
successfully persuade Congress by "going public. " "Going public" occurs when the 
president promotes himself and his policies in Washington by appeafing to the American 
public for support (Kernell 1997, 2). There are several ways the president can go public. 
For example, he can make prime-time nationwide addresses, speak at business luncheons, 
visit schools, hold press conferences with foreign dignitaries, and host dinners at the 
White House. By going public, the president is not trying to gain the votes of the 
American public, but rather the votes of its representatives in Washington. 
Going public has only recently become a prominent form of presidential 
communication, even though it originated during Theodore Roosevelt's administration. 
Unlike the last half of the century, going public was used infiequently during the first half 
of the century, largely because the presidents were confined to Washington and obliged 
to speak to the nation through newspapers (Kernell 1997, 2). Yet some of these 
presidents were able to obtain public support by going public. Their attempts increased 
confidence in going public as a means of gaining public support, 
Theodore Roosevelt was the first president to enunciate the principle of going 
public by describing the presidency as a "bully pulpit" (Kernell 1997, 2). He used the 
"bully pulpit" to make public appeals for his Progressive reforms. Another president who 
attempted to go public was Woodrow Wilson. However, unlike Theodore Roosevelt's 
"bully pulpit, " Wilson's whistle-stop tour to gain support for the League of Nations treaty 
was unsuccessful Finally, Franklin D. Roosevelt is often remembered for his nationwide 
"fireside chats. " He used these public addresses to convince Washington's politicians of 
his continuing national mandate for the New Deal Each of these presidents' campaigns 
to obtain public support were significant largely because they were rare (Kernell 1997, 
2). 
The advancement of technology has allowed modern presidents to reach the 
public much easier than their predecessors. Developments in transportation and mass 
communications provide the president many opportunities to directly address the people 
of the nation. As a result, for the last half of the century, presidents have been going 
public routinely. In fact, each president goes public more fiequently than his 
predecessor, and this trend is likely to continue. 
Despite the increase in going public and its popularity among presidents, there is 
no evidence that going public is truly effective at gaining public support. If it is not 
effective, presidents are wasting valuable resources, like time and money, that could be 
used in a more efficient way (Edwards 1997, 93). Furthermore, if going public is 
ineffective, presidents either need to find a more reliable way of gaining public support or 
find another way to persuade Congress to pass their policies. 
The objective of this paper is to determine whether the president can increase 
public approval by going public. I will do this through a systematic study of several 
domestic and foreign policy issues during the Bush administration. An examination of 
President Bush's administration is relevant to determining the effectiveness of going 
public for several reasons. First, Bush is a modern president whose administration came 
late enough in the century that it could benefit Iiom all of the technological advancements 
that make going public possible Also, Bush served as Vice President under Ronald 
Reagan, who was often heralded as the "Great Communicator. " In this position, he 
would have experienced and learned from Reagan's successful and unsuccessful attempts 
at going public. Finally, because of the recent development of the George Bush 
Presidential Library and the resources available at the Center for Presidential Studies, 
there is an unprecedented collection of documents, polls and transcripts horn Bush's 
presidential administration that are readily available for analysis. 
For this study, I will examine four issues about which Bush went public: the 
Persian Gulf Crisis, War on Drugs, North American Free Trade Agreement, and Budget 
Act of 1990. These issues represent most of the issues that every president addresses 
during his administration: foreign and domestic, general and specific. By comparing his 
addresses on these issues to the corresponding changes in public opinion, I will be able to 
determine whether President Bush was able to obtain and maintain public support by 
going public. 
The President and the Public 
A considerable amount of literature exists on the president's ability to lead public 
opinion, This literature examines the nature of public opinion, the president's ability to 
manipulate public opinion through activities like delivering speeches or taking 
international trips, and the president's ability to lead public opinion on policy issues. 
Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro address the nature of public opimon in their 
book, The Rational Public. Whereas many people believe that public opinion is unstable, 
unpredictable, and whimsical, Page and Shapiro established that this could be true of 
individual opinion, but not collective opinion. In fact, collective public opinion has 
characteristics largely different fiom the opinions of individual citizens. Whereas 
individual opinions are, often inconsistent, largely because individuals cannot easily 
ascertain policy implications (Edwards 1997, 94), Page and Shapiro found that the public 
holds stable and sensible opinions about public policy and that these opinions change 
reasonably in response to new information and changing circumstances (Page and 
Shapiro 1992, 2, 383), Furthermore, changes in public opinion happen slowly, are 
modest, and usually occur at the margin. Sharp, rapid changes in public opinion are rare 
and generally only occur in response to dramatic events (Page and Shapiro 1992, 54, 
385). 
Whereas Page and Shapiro emphasize the short-term stability of American's 
policy preferences, William Mayer's The Changing American Mind emphasizes long- 
term changes in public opinion. In a comparison of public opinion in 1960 and in 1988, 
Mayer found that American public opinion changed enormously on an impressive array 
of issues, For example, the public has recast its views on race, gender, and sexual mores. 
Mayer also observed sharp swings in opinion regarding defense spending and the Soviet 
Union. Furthermore, public opinion reflected a gradual decline in the popularity of 
business and government (Mayer 1993, 111). 
Even though Mayer argues that public opinion lacks long-term stability, he 
acknowledges that the American public has remained constant on some issues. For 
instance, there is still widespread disapproval of homosexuality and extramarital sex. 
Additionally, Americans still advocate marriage and support hiring on the basis of merit 
rather than preferential treatment of women and minorities (Mayer 1993, 112). Despite 
the public's consistency on some issues, Mayer concludes that public opinion has 
demonstrated significant long-term changes on a variety of issues and that the American 
mind is not the same today as it was in 1960 (Mayer 1993, 112). 
Taken together, this literature suggests that public opinion is more likely to 
experience long-term, gradual changes rather than short-term, abrupt changes. Also, 
public opinion is not capricious but behaves rationally in response to changes in 
information and events. Furthermore, the public is more stable on some issues than 
others. 
The nature of public opinion is both beneficial and detrimental to the president 
and his attempts to obtain public support by going public. On one hand, the stability and 
rationality of public opinion mean that the president can obtain support through the 
presentation of new information or alteration of circumstances. On the other hand, 
because of its stability, fluctuations in public opinion are rare, Therefore, the president 
has the potential to move only a small portion of the public fiom opposition to support by 
going public (Edwards1989, 145; Page and Shapiro 1992, 65). Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that even a modest shift in public opinion can be the key to the 
president's success in Washington (Edwards 1989, 136). 
In addition to changes in information and circumstances, public opinion is also 
affected by less dynamic factors such as political party identification and a general 
positivity bias (Edwards 1997, 105). For example, individuals who align themselves with 
the president's political party are predisposed to support him and his policies. Likewise, 
those who are not members of the president's party are generally predisposed to opposing 
his policies. This phenomenon of predisposed support is also reflected in Congress: 
congressmen of the president's party are more likely to support his policies than 
congressmen who are not of his party, Therefore, under conditions of divided 
government, public support is necessary to the president's success because it allows him 
to persuade congressmen Rom the other side of the aisle to favor his policies. 
Similar to party identification, America's positivity bias, a tendency to evaluate 
public figures and institutions positively, is another predisposing factor that affects public 
opinion towards the president edwards 1997, 106). The positivity bias is most likely to 
influence public opinion towards the president and his policies during ambiguous 
situations such as the beginning of the president's first term As a result, the president 
could potentially have an easier time obtaining public support for his policies during the 
beginning of his administration than later in his administration. 
One final characteristic of public opinion is that issue saliency is directly related 
to issue coverage. In other words, heightened coverage of an issue increases the issue's 
salience and increases the probability that individual opinions about the issue will be 
activated (Jacobs and Shapiro 1994, 528; Page and Shapiro 1992, 8). As a result, the 
president may be able to change public opinion by bringing his policy issues to the 
public's attention. 
In Jeflrey E. Cohen's "Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda, 
" a time-series 
regression analysis of presidents' State of the Union addresses was used to show that by 
simply mentioning an issue, the president is able to heighten public attention and 
concern 
with the problem (102). He also notes, however, that even though the president can set 
the public's agenda, it will not stay that way for long if he does not repeatedly rally the 
public and institutionalize the mobilization process (102). This temporary success in 
setting the public's agenda can even create a false sense of power for the president (102). 
Going public is an attempt by presidents to increase issue saliency and obtain 
public support, even though they are limited by the nature of public opinion. Because of 
the constraints of public opinion, the president's success at going public depends on 
several factors. For example, in order for the president to effectively go public, the 
public must pay attention to the president's address, understand what he says, 
remember 
his message, and let their congressmen know that they support the president's position, 
Without all of these steps occurrhtg, the president will be unable to gain support in 
Washington for his policies. 
Although the president can increase understanding and gain support by going 
public about an issue, this strategy is not always successful. For example, in a study that 
explored viewers' reactions to President Reagan's speeches, Roberta Glaros and Bruce 
Miroff found that even an eloquent and articulate president had difliculty mobilizing 
support (25). Glaros and Miroff speak of the public's selective perception towards the 
president as an explanation for Reagan's difficulty in obtaining support. In their study, 
they observed that the viewers chose lrom two alternate value systems and images of 
America, and evaluated the president by these standards. Even though the viewers all 
watched the same public addresses, their perceptions of the addresses were profoundly 
influenced by their value systems and their predispositions towards the president. 
The viewers who held the same values as Reagan and were knowledgeable of his 
policies were predisposed to support him and his agenda. They easily identified with the 
themes and values expressed by the president. Furthermore, his addresses validated their 
self-images and strengthened their approval of him. For the viewers who were inattentive 
towards politics, Reagan's addresses increased issue saliency but decreased their mist, 
support, and approval of him and his policies. Finally, for the politically attentive 
viewers who did not hold the same values as Reagan, identifying with his themes and 
values was very difficult. Unlike the supporters, Reagan's addresses alienated the 
opposers and renewed their criticism of his policies. 
Reagan was unsuccessful at obtaining the support of the opposers and had 
difficulty influencing the viewers who were uninterested and uninformed about politics 
(44). His addresses seemed only to reinforce the viewers' value systems and 
predispositions towards him This partly explains why the president has the potential to 
move only a small portion of the public at a thne (Edwards1989, 135, 143; Page and 
Shapiro 1992, 65). 
Of course, the results fiom Glaros and Miroff s study beg the question of whether 
the president ever actually leads the public or just responds to public opinion. In other 
words, does he direct or facilitate public opinion? Jacobs and Shapiro found strong 
evidence that the president facilitates public opinion by examining Kennedy's 1960 
presidential campaign. They show that Kennedy polled the public for issues that were 
most important to them and then campaigned heavily on those issues, thus heightening 
issue concern and creating an ambiguous leader-follower relationship (537). 
In contrast to Jacobs and Shapiro's claim that the president follows public opinion, 
Bruce Miroff speaks of the president's ability to lead public opinion in his article "The 
President and the Public; Leadership as Spectacle. 
" Because the public can be difficult to 
lead through speeches, presidents have started to use spectacles to obtain public support. 
Presidential spectacles are staged events covered by mass media and designed to present 
the president as a decisive, tough, courageous, prudent, and personal leader (275-276). 
Spectacle has risen as a form of presidential leadership partly because of the 
increase in mass media coverage and the president's rise to primacy in the political 
system (Miroff 1995, 276). In presidential spectacles, the contemporary president is the 
star performer and portrayed as "the spectacular representation of a living human being. 
" 
He is assisted by a team who can either enhance or detract from the president's spectacle, 
depending on whether they underscore his strengths or underscore his weaknesses 
(Miroff 1995, 277). Finally, carefully executed gestures are used to convey the meaning 
of the president's actions to the public. These gestures can be used to overshadow facts 
and results to make the president appear more powerful than the results of his actions 
indicated (Miroff 1995, 278). 
According to Miroff, President Bush engaged in two main spectacles during his 
administration: the foreign affairs spectacle and the domestic affairs spectacle. His 
foreign affairs spectacle was highly successfuL Even though there were many flaws in 
Bush's foreign policy, his foreign affairs spectacle portrayed him as masterful, confident, 
and decisively in charge (Miroff 1995, 288). His foreign policy team, including people 
like Colin Powell, Brent Scowcroft, and Richard Cheney, magnified Bush's power with 
their popularity as military subordinates (Miroff 1995, 288). Finny, Bush's military 
actions in Panama and the Persian Gulf contributed to his ability to lead the public by 
creating exciting drama as part of his foreign affairs spectacle (Miroff 1995, 288). 
In contrast to his foreign policy spectacle, President Bush's domestic policy 
spectacle was a failure. Bush came across as an uncertain, awkward man, especially in 
the realm of economic policy (Miroff 1995, 289). His economic team only magnified his 
weaknesses by epitomizing inaction and indecisiveness. Finally, several small gestures 
also worked against Bush by conveying to the public that Bush was entirely removed 
Rom their economic problems, 
Even though neither going public nor leading by spectacle is guaranteed to obtain 
public support, the president may find it easier to obtain support for general rather than 
specific policies (Edwards1989, 131). Whereas general policies tend to appeal to 
widespread values, specific policies are often too intricate and complicated for the public 
to understand or to care about. (Edwards 1989, 131). 
The president may also find it easier to lead the public in foreign policy rather 
than domestic policy. Whereas domestic policy directly affects the public, is more salient 
to the people, and can be easily criticized by the president's opponents, foreign policy is 
complex, specialized, and distant (Edwards 1997, 116-118). Because of the differences 
in nature of foreign and domestic policy, the public seeks leadership fiom the president 
on foreign policy issues much more so than on domestic policy issues. 
Although an enormous literature focuses on the president's ability to influence 
public opinion by "going public, 
" there is also reason to doubt the president's ability to 
change public opinion. First, many studies assume that presidential rhetoric has an 
impact on public opinion, even though this assumption has not been proven (Edwards 
1996, 207-209). Second, studies such as Glaros and Miroff s research on viewers' 
reactions to the president indicate that the president may have more difficulty in 
obtaining public support by going public than conventional wisdom holds. 
Third, in his paper "Gauging the Public Response to Presidential Leadership" Lee 
Sigelman argues that all prior research establishing the president's ability to lead public 
opinion has been based on fallacious statistical methods, The basic problem is that the 
research gives an estimate of public support for a policy, given presidential advocacy of 
the poHcy, but not of public support for the policy, irrespective of presidential advocacy 
(Sigelman 1980, 428). He suggests that instead, surveys be taken that first ascertain 
individuals' policy preferences and then mark changes in these preferences when the 
individuals are informed that the president holds a strong opiiuon contrary to their own 
(430). Although surveys using this method displayed very little public reluctance to 
changing their opinions and deferring to the wishes of the president, the shortcomings in 
prior research "mean that the conclusions that have been drawn. . . are of questionable 
validity" (432). 
Finally, analyses of prior presidents show that their attempts to obtain public 
support by going public were unsuccessful. In his paper "Presidential Rhetoric: What 
Difference Does It Make?, " Dr, George Edwards, director of the Center for Presidential 
Studies, examines Ronald Reagan's administration to determine whether the president 
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can lead public opinion. If the president could lead public opinion, it would most likely 
be evident during Reagan's administration because he was viewed as a strong leader by 
the public and was labeled the "Great Communicator" for his exceptional communication 
skills. However, despite Reagan's supposed communication skills, Edwards found that 
he was unable to induce lasting changes in American policy preferences (Edwards 1996, 
214), In fact, whenever Reagan tried to change or mobilize public opinion, he typically 
met with failure (Edwards 1996, 2 14). As a result, the popularity that Reagan 
experienced was probably caused by the pre-existing tide of conservatism that existed 
before Reagan took office, not his ability to lead public opinion (Edwards 1996, 212). 
Through this systematic study of President Bush's ability to change public 
opinion, I hope to determine whether going public is an effective way of gaining public 
support or if it is an ineffective expenditure of the president's valuable resources. Given 
the popularity and increased use of going public, a conclusive determination of its 
effectiveness would have significant implications for the field of political science, 
political parties, and the presidency itself. 
H~~esheses 
Because of the multiple factors that influence the president's ability to effectively 
go public, President Bush was probably unsuccessful in obtaining public 
support. In fact, 
it is likely that all of his attempts at going public will be ineffective except for his 
nationwide addresses. These addresses may be more successful because the president is 
able to directly address the nation without interference. Furthermore, because nationwide 
addresses are inl'requent and usually broadcast during prime-time, the public is more 
likely to listen to the president, giving him unobstructed access to the largest audience 
possible. 
The fiequency with which Bush addresses an issue will also have little to no 
effect on public approval or disapprovaL In contrast, the audiences he addresses may 
influence his ability to change public opinion. For example, he may have more success 
in changing public opinion if he focuses on 'addressing the general public rather than 
Congress or the press exclusively. This could be due to the stability of public opinion, 
the spin of the media, or the complexity of executing the steps necessary for going public 
to be successfuL However, determining the cause of President Bush' s ability or inability 
to change public opinion is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Although I hypothesize that Bush will be generally unsuccessful at obtaining 
support by going public, I also hypothesize that his efforts to obtain support will greatly 
increase issue saliency because the more coverage an issue receives, the more salient it 
becomes. Finally, what little success Bush experiences will depend on the issue 
addressed. He will have the most success with the issues in the following order, Rom 
greatest to least success: 
1. Persian Gulf Crisis 
2. War on Drugs 
3. North American Free Trade Agreement 
4. Budget Act of 1990 
Bush will have the most success obtaunng support for the Persian Gulf Crisis 
because it is a foreign policy issue for which the public tends to defer to the president. 
Similarly, the War on Drugs will be a comparatively successful issue because it is general 
and not complicated by specificity. It will be less successful than the Persian Gulf Crisis, 
however, because it is a domestic issue and the public does not follow the president as 
willingly on domestic issues as on foreign issues. The North American Free Trade 
Agreement, a foreign policy, economic, and specific issue, will be less successful than 
the War on Drugs because of its specificity and economic focus. Similarly, the Budget 
Act of 1990 will be least successful because it is domestic, economic and specific by 
nature. 
Methods and Measures 
Given time and resource constraints, I was unable to examine every issue 
considered by the Bush administration. Instead, I analyzed Bush's success at obtaining 
public support for four issues about which he went public: the Persian Gulf Crisis, War 
on Drugs, North American Free Trade Agreement, and Budget Act of 1990. 
The Center for Presidential Studies maintains a comprehensive collection of 
President Bush's public addresses. I used this database to examine all of the addresses in 
which Bush discussed one of the four issues of concern. These sources provided 
complete details on Bush's attempts to go public, including who he addressed and which 
issue was of primary focus. For each address, I recorded the date and time, whether his 
comments were initiated or in response to a question, and the number of paragraphs Bush 
spoke about each issue. I coded Bush's frequency as the number of paragraphs that he 
spoke about the issue because this would provide a highly accurate assessment of his 
level of focus on each issue at any given time. 
I also coded for the type of audience he addressed, differentiating between 
reporters, press conferences, the general public, Congress and congressmen, the nation as 
a whole, foreign persons, and the military. I made distinctions between each of these 
groups because the president's success at obtaining public support may depend on whom 
he addresses. For instance, comments Bush makes at a press conference may be more 
likely to be covered by the press and received by the public than comments made to a 
random group of reporters. These audience types were not selected arbitrarily, but were 
taken directly from each address I examined. 
After coding Bush's addresses, I analyzed the Gallup polls taken throughout his 
administration to determine the effect he had, if any, on public opinion, Gallup took 
public opinion polls one to fom times a month for all four years of Bush's presidency. It 
also took issue polls at random to obtain the public' s opinion about specific matters. The 
lrequeucy of the Gallup polls make it a good measure for changes in public approval, as 
does its world-renowned accuracy for gauging public opinion, 
I compared the president' s effect on public opinion through a graphical analysis 
of each question. Percentages of approval were graphed on the y-axis while the dates of 
the polls served as the time-line marked on the x-axis. The president's frequency of 
address was also marked on the y-axis to compare its fluctuations to changes in public 
opinion. To graphically represent the frequency with which Bush spoke about each issue, 
I calculated the number of paragraphs spoken between each poll and used this as the 
Irequency measurement. For example, if Bush dedicated 300 paragraphs to the Persian 
Gulf Crisis between January 3, 1991 and February 2, 1991, then lrequency would be 
plotted at 300 paragraphs for February 2. 
Although graphical analysis is an efficient way to interpret the president's effect 
on public opinion, I encountered a few difficulties. First, some questions were polled 
infiequently, leaving large time gaps between the measurements of public opinion. In 
these situations, a summation of Bush's fiequency of address between the two distant 
polls would inaccurately portray his effect on public opinion. For example, if a question 
was asked once every two years, a summation of all the paragraphs spoken during this 
time would be enormous. As a result, it would appear that Bush' s fiequency of address 
had skyrocketed while public opinion may 'increase only slightly or even decrease. 
Therefore, in these situations I did not calculate all of the paragraphs between polls, but 
rather the paragraphs lrom the last five or six polls, which generally covered the past five 
or six months. This method better reflects the president' s effect on public opinion. 
Another difficulty was that only one question about the Balanced Budget Act of 
1990 was asked while Bush was going public to push the bill through Congress, By the 
time Gallup started to poll the public' s approval, the bill had already been passed into 
law. As a result, evidence about Bush's ability to gain public support for the act is 
inconclusive. However, I measured changes in public opinion regarding the federal 
budget deficit throughout Bush's administration. By looking at polls beyond Bush's 
attempts to go public, I will be able to draw conclusions regarding his ability to not only 
obtain, but Wo to maintain public support, 
Additionally, public opinion is heavily influenced by media coverage. Since the 
president's usual mode of communication with the public is via media, his ability to 
reach the public and convey his message is dependent on media subjectivity. The media 
can spin the president's messages positively or negatively. Similarly, the media may not 
cover the president's addresses, thus preventing them Rom reaching the public. Since the 
president constantly depends on the media, its interference in his ability to obtain public 
support also constantly remains. However I did not analyze the effect that media 
coverage of the president had on public opinion for two reasons. First, I acknowledge in 
my analysis that media coverage is a constant factor in the president's ability to 
successfully go public. Second, this paper seeks to examine the relationship between 
presidential addresses and public opinion, not media coverage and public opinion. 
Finally, because polls are taken every few weeks, it is difficult to determine the 
president's direct and immediate effect on the public, However, even though an ideal 
measure of the president' s effect on public opinion would be to take polls after each of 
the president's addresses, these polls may reflect higher, unstable approval ratings 
compared to the polls taken every two weeks. Although the president needs to obtain 
public support, he also needs it to remain stable long enough to persuade Congress with 
it. Therefore, polls taken every two weeks are reasonable sources of measurement 
because they reflect more stable trends in public opinion than those taken daily. 
Results 
I will present the results of the president's success at going public by issue. Each 
question will be examined individually and analyzed according to its graphical 
representations. For each issue, with the exception of NAFTA, I will analyze the results 
of the "most important problem" and "approve of the way Bush handles" questions first, 
so that Bush's relative success with an issue can be easily compared to his success with 
other issues, These questions were not included in the analysis of NAFTA because data 
was unavailable. 
The "most important problem" question identifies what issue the public thinks is 
the nation' s most important problem. It is a measure of issue salience and compares 
public concern about an issue to other issues. In contrast, the "approve of the way Bush 
handles" question measures public opinion towards the president and his policies on 
issues. For example, if the public supports Bush's policy on an issue, approval of the 
way he handles that issue would most likely increase. 
The poll dates that are aligned along the y-axis are coded for brevity, A month 
abbreviation is the first segment, followed by the dates the poll was taken and the last two 
digits of the year in which it was taken. For example, "mh3689" represents the poll that 
was taken from March 6 to March 9, 1989. Additionally, the polls are ordered 
chronologically from the poll in which the question first appeared to the one in which it 
last appeared. 
The legends of the following graphs will contain several words whose meanings 
also need to be defined. "App" or "appro" represent public approvaL Likewise, "disapp" 
represents public disapproval "Talk" represents the fiequency with which Bush 
addressed the issue. For the qualitative questions, "NT" means "not too" and "Not" 
means "not very. " Finally, "talk" indicates the number of paragraphs that Bush spoke 
about the issue. 
Only the fi'equency of the president's addresses is compared to changes in public 
opinion for each question. After analyzing the results of the president's frequency on 
public opinion, I wifi also examine the effect of audience type on public opinion. 
Persian Gulf Crisis 
Upon reviewing the polls, I selected the most relevant questions pertaining to 
each of the four issues, in addition to the "most important problem" and "approve of the 
way Bush handles" questions. For the Persian Gulf Crisis I analyzed responses to the 
following questions: "Do you approve of sending troops to Saudi Arabia?, 
" "Do you 
favor going to war with Iraq?, 
" 
"How closely have you followed the situation in Iraq?, 
" 
and "Do you think the situation in Iraq was worth going to war over?" 
Each of these questions is relevant to analyzing Bush's success at obtaining public 
support for involvement in the Persian Gulf Crisis. For example, approval ratings for the 
decision to send troops to Saudi Arabia reflect the president's ability to change public 
opinion on a more specific policy, On the other hand, changes in support for going to 
war with Iraq demonstrates the president' s ability to change public opinion about a more 
general policy. Similar to the "most important problem" question, measuring how 
closely the public follows the simation in Iraq also gauges issue salience. Finally, public 
opinion about whether the situation was worth a war is similar to the information that is 
provided by the "support going to war" question. However, unlike the previous question, 
this question measures the president' s success at both obtaining and maintaining support 
because this question gauged public opinion before, during, and after the war. 
The American public considered the Persian Gulf Crisis to be its most important 
problem immediately after the United States entered the conflict. Concern about the 
conflict augmented its status as the nation's most important problem in the months 
leading up to the war, but it did not reach its highest point until after United States' troops 
began fighting against Iraq. When it did peak, 37. 7 percent of the public considered it to 
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be the nation' s most important problem. Out of the four issues examined, this was the 
highest percentage received for the nation's most important problem status. Figure 1 
compares the trequency of the president's addresses about the Persian Gulf Crisis to the 
change in its level as the nation's most important problem. 
Figure I: "Persian Gulf Crisis as the Most Important Problem" 
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From this graph, it is evident that Bush's speeches may have influenced public 
opinion before the conflict, but clearly had no effect after the conflict began. For 
example, immediately after the conflict began, Bush spoke very little about the crisis, yet 
its status as the most important problem skyrocketed, Furthermore, after the United 
States' victory over Iraq, the Person Gulf Crisis's status as a problem slumped to four 
percent and quickly became the nation's least important problem, despite Bush's 
continued use of the crisis to appeal for support on other issues, Based on when the issue 
declined in importance, it seems likely that the issue's rapid decline was because the war 
had ended. 
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In this case it appears that public opinion did not change in response to Bush' s 
attempts at going public, but rather to changes in the circumstances and events 
surrounding the conflict, The most definitive evidence for this is the simultaneous 
decrease in Bush' s fiequency of address and increase in the issue's status as most 
important problem While this increase did not correlate well with Bush's attempts at 
going public, it did correlate well with the events of the conflict. 
Similar to the "most important problem" results, Bush was also unable to obtain 
public approval for the way he handled the crisis situation through his attempts at going 
public. Here again it seems that public opinion responded to circumstances and events 
more than to Bush's addresses. Figure 2 compares the fi'equency of Bush's addresses to 
public opinion about how he handled the situation, 
Figure 2: "Approval of the Way Bush is Handling Situation In Iraq" 
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This graph depicts an interesting inverse correlation between public approval and 
Bush's addresses, with the exception of a slight variation between February 22-28 and 
after July 18, 1991. Although this inverse correlation does not mean that the public 
responded negatively to Bush' s addresses, it does mean that Bush was unsuccessful at 
obtaining public approval by going public. 
This graph reveals another interesting phenomenon; after Bush's nationwide 
address on February 27, his approval rose six percent. A similar level of approval was 
observed in the next poll, after Bush had made two more nationwide addresses, He 
continued to go public and, even though he did not address the nation as a whole again, 
considerably increased his ffequency of addresses. However, despite his efforts, Bush 
experienced a twelve percent decrease in approval by April 4, 1991. This could mean 
that the president may be more effective at going public through nationwide addresses 
rather than other kinds of addresses. Although, it could also mean that the Persian Gulf 
Crisis was no longer an issue for the American public because the war was over. 
Responses to the question of whether the public approved of the United States' 
decision to send troops to Saudi Arabia against Iraq also demonstrated an inability of the 
president to gain public support by going public. Figure 3 compares the trequency of the 
president's addresses to public opinion on the issue. 
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Figure 31 "Approval of Decision to Send Troops to Saudi Arabia A. gainst Iraq" 
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This graph depicts a steady, gradual decline in public approval, entirely 
unaffected by the president's addresses. In fact, when Bush's frequency reached its 
highest point, public approval reached its lowest. Similar to previous observations, I 
believe that in this situation public opinion changed in response to events and 
circumstances. More specifically, this graph only reflects changes in public opinion in 
the five months before the conflict started. Therefore, it is possible that the sustained 
deployment of inactive troops was such a strong influence on public opinion that it was 
unaffected by the president's attempts to increase support. 
The results from the question "Do you favor or oppose going to war with Iraq?" 
further validate the president's inability to obtain public support by going public, They 
also provide more evidence that public opinion is responsive to changes in events and to 
the president's nationwide addresses. The results are portrayed in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: "Favor Going to War with Iraq" 
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Public opinion was unresponsive to Bush' s addresses until 
the conflict began. It 
then jumped 20 percent, even though Bush's addresses decreased by nearly 
50 percent. 
This dramatic increase in public opinion also followed 
iminediately after Bush' s flrst two 
nationwide addresses on the Persian Gulf Crisis. It is difficult to 
determine the cause of 
the increase in public approval because the events of the conflict 
and the president' s 
nationwide addresses are inseparable. However, it is evident 
from this graph that a 
combination of changes in events and presidential addresses to the 
nation was successful 
at obtaining public approval to go to war against Iraq. 
Similar to nationwide addresses, the president seems to have 
more success with 
increasing issue saliency than obtaining public support. 
Like "Most Important Problem, 
" 
issue salience was also measured through the question 
"How closely have you followed 
the situation in Iraq?" Responses to this question are compared 
to the trequency of the 
president's addresses in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5: "How Closely Have Yon Followed the Situation in 
Iraq?" 
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Although this graph only shows slight variations in 
public opinion, it is evident 
that the president' s addresses contributed to issue 
saliency. Every time there was a rise in 
the hequency of the president's addresses, it was followed by 
an increase in the 
percentage of people who felt they had followed the situation 
in Iraq very closely. 
However, it is important to note that public opinion 
did not increase in proportion to the 
president's increase in trequency. For example, when 
Bush's level of trequency doubled 
shortly before the conflict started, public saliency 
did not double as welL In fact, for such 
a dramatic increase in going public, the corresponding 
increase in saliency is curiously 
minimal. However, the president's dramatic increase 
in addresses could have caused the 
limited increase in saliency. For example, if individuals 
were not able to listen to most of 
Bush' s addresses, they may have felt less informed 
about the crisis than if they were able 
to listen to a greater percentage of his addresses. 
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It is also important to note that issue saliency greatly 
increased after the conflict 
began. Although some of this could be attributed to 
Bush' s continued addresses, this 
increase in saliency does not follow the same pattern 
as before. Therefore, other factors 
such as heightened media coverage or the "rally 
around the flag" effect may have 
contributed to this increase in saliency. 
Finally, the results t'rom the "worth 
war" question provide the best evidence for 
public opinion changing in response to the 
president' s addresses. Although there is only 
a general correlation between public opinion 
and the president's t'requency of address, 
compared to all other questions on the Persian 
Gulf Crisis, the results of this question 
portray Bush's ability to change public opinion 
the most favorably. Figure 6 depicts the 
president's success at changing public opinion. 
Figure 6: "Situation in Iraq Is Worth Going to War 
Over" 
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Similar to the results in previous graphs, an astronomical 
30 percent increase in 
public support for going to war was observed after 
the conflict began. Once again, the 
beginning of the conflict coincided with Bush's first two nationwide 
addresses about the 
crisis, making it impossible to distinguish which event, 
or combination thereof, was 
responsible for the increase in approval However, it 
is noteworthy that public approval 
for the war remained relatively high for a year after 
the conflict ended. Although this 
could be because of the United States' success, it could also 
be because Bush continued 
to use the Persian Gulf Crisis to appeal to the public 
for support on other issues, lt is 
possible, then, that public approval was sustained 
because the nation was constantly 
reminded of the United States' victory over the destructive forces 
in the Middle East. 
War on Drugs 
In addition to examining the results of the "most important 
problem" and 
"approve of way Bush handles" questions, I looked at the 
results for the questions 
regarding Bush's progress with the drug situation 
and whether the drug problem was 
better, worse, or the same because of Bush. These questions 
measure the public's 
evaluation of Bush' s performance on the issue and their results 
will indicate whether the 
public felt Bush's drug policies were effective. 
Although the drug problem was never ranked as the 
nation' s most important 
problem and it only averaged 4 overall, public response 
to this question appears to be 
directly affected by the president's I'requency of address. The 
results are portrayed in 
Figure 7. 
Figure 71 "Drugs as Most Important Problem" 
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The War on Drugs was one of Bush's main policy issues at 
the beginning of his 
administration. However, as his administration developed 
and issues became more 
complex, the War on Drugs was set on the backburner. 
This graph shows that when the 
War on Drugs was an issue for Bush, it was also an 
issue for the public. Likewise, it 
shows that when Bush stopped talking about the drug 
issue, the public stopped focusing 
on it as welL 
Unlike in the early years of his administration, public concern 
about the drug 
problem did not increase when Bush refocused on the 
War on Drugs during his 1992 
campaign. In fact, the public was completely unresponsive 
to his speeches. This could 
be evidence that it is very difficult for the president to 
change public opinion on an issue 
during a campaign. 
Bush had more difficulty increasing public approval of the way 
he handled the 
drug situation than he did with increasing concern 
about the drug problem. From the 
29 
results shown in Figure 8, it appears that Bush was 
unable to change public opinion on 
this question by going public. 
Figure 8: "Approval of Way Bush is Handbag Drug Situation" 
100. 0 
90. 0 
80. 0 
~o 700 
6o, o 
50. 0 
~ 
0 40. 0 
30. 0 
g 10. 0 
0. 0 
Ul 
C& 
E 
Date 
0) 
rv (0 
1000 
900 
8OO 
700 g g 
600 ~~ e 
500 ~ g 
400 
300 ~ ~o 
100 
0 
~% Approval ~ ¹ Paragraphs 
Regardless of Bush' s level of focus on the drug problem, public 
approval of the 
way Bush handled the situation remained relatively 
constant. However, the slight 
increases in approval at either end of the administration 
could be attributed to Bush's 
heightened focus on the drug problem: in the beginning 
it was one of his prime issues and 
in the end a campaign issue. Yet overall, this graph 
indicates that the president was 
unable to change public opinion by going public. 
Results from other questions also indicate that 
Bush was unable to obtain public 
approval by going public about the drug problem. 
For example, near the end of his 
administration, 14. 5% of the public thought that the drug problem 
was better because of 
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Bush, while 48. 1% thought it was worse and 32. 9% thought it was the same, despite all 
his efforts. 
Responses to the question "Has Bush made progress with the drug problem?" also 
reflected poorly upon the president's ability to change public opinion by going public. 
The results are shown in Figure 9. 
Figure 9: "Bush's Progress with the Drug Problem" 
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This graph shows that the public was unaffected by the president's addresses. In 
fact, when his trequency increases, pubiic support decreases, and vice versa. This is most 
striking in November 1990 when Bush's fiequency of address triples and public support 
decreases ten percent. Also, in February of 1990, Bush's frequency drops heavily, yet 
public support rises slightly, However, this increase in support could be in response to a 
nationwide address that Bush had made a week earlier. 
Although results l'rom the War on Drugs do not reflect positively on the 
president's ability to obtain public support by going public, they do show that the 
president is able to increase public concern about an issue by going public. Changes in 
opinion regarding Bush' s progress with the drug problem also indicate that the president 
may be more likely to obtain public support through nationwide addresses than through 
other forms of public addresses. 
North American Free Trade Agreement 
For the North American Free Trade Agreement, I examined the results of the 
following questions: "Do you think NAFI'A is good for the U. S. ?, " "Have you heard of 
NAFTA?, " "Do you approve of NAFTA?, " "Which country will benefit most from the 
agreement?, " and "Which country will be hurt most by the agreement?" These questions 
measure support for the agreement, issue salience, and Bush's ability to convince the 
public that NAFI'A is a good policy. 
Questions about the North American Free Trade Agreement provide similar 
results to the questions about the War on Drugs: Bush was very successful at increasing 
issue saliency and not so successful at obtaining support. For example, responses to the 
question "Have you heard of NAFI'A?" increased in direct relation to the president's 
addresses. These results are displayed in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10: "Heard of NAF1'A" 
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However, as seen before, an increase in issue saliency did not necessarily mean an 
increase in public support. For instance, near the end of Bush's attempts to obtain 
support for the agreement by going public, Gallup asked the following question: "Do you 
approve of NAFTA?" Even after all of Bush's efforts to lead the public on this issue, 
57. 1% of the public did not approve of NAFTA while only 33. 5% did. 
On the other hand, there were cases when an increase in issue saliency did 
translate as an increase in public approval For example, when asked if NAFTA was 
good for the U. S. , both issue saliency and the percentage of affirmative responses 
dramatically increased after Bush concentrated on going public about NAFTA. These 
results are shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11: "Do You Think NAFTA Is Good For the U. S. ?" 
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Like the other questions on NAFTA, Bush received mixed results on evaluations of his 
ability to convince the public that NAFTA was good for the United S tates. In response to 
the question "Which country will benefit most Irom NAFTA?, " public opinion about how 
the U. S. would be affected remained constant, as Figure 12 shows. 
Figure 12: "Which Country Will Benefit Most From NAFTA?" 
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However, the results from the question "Which country is most likely to be hurt 
by NAFTA?" directly contradict the results fiom the previous question. Whereas public 
opinion remained constant about the United States' possible benefit from NAFI'A, 
responses indicating that the U. S. would suffer the most increased as Bush's addresses 
increased. These results are depicted in Figure 13. 
Figure 13: "Which Country Is Most Likely to Be Hurt by NAFTA?" 
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Results tram the questions on NAFTA show that the president was able to 
increase issue saliency by going public and that in some instances, this increase in 
saliency led to an increase in public approval However, the president was only partially 
successful in obtaining support for NAFTA by going public and increasing issue 
saliency. Whereas an increase in issue saliency seemed to help the president gain support 
in some areas, it also seemed to work against him in others, such as the question about 
which country would most likely be hurt by NAFTA. 
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Balanced Budget Act of 1990 
Because the Balanced Budget Act of 1990 was passed in November of 1989, 
Bush only talked about it during the first year of his administration. However, only one 
question about the Act was asked before it was passed. This alone may be indicative of 
the public' s interest or salience about the issue, Regardless, it is difficult to determine 
Bush' s effect on public opinion for the Balanced Budget Act of 1990 because polls were 
not taken. Therefore, I have used this issue to look at Bush' s ability to maintain public 
support for an issue. 
I used results fiom the following questions, in addition to those from the "most 
important problem" and "approve of the way Bush handles" questions, to determine 
Bush's abUity to obtain and maintain support for the Bahnced Budget Act and sumlar 
economic policies: "Has Bush made progress with the federal budget deficit?, " and? Do 
you favor Bush's new plan?" These questions will indicate the public's opinion of 
Bush's performance on the issue and whether Bush was able to obtain support for bis 
policy by going public, 
The first "most important problem" question was asked the week after the 
Balanced Budget Act was passed Originally, the federal budget deficit was only 
considered to be the nation's most important problem by seven percent of the public. 
However, as Figure 14 illustrates, public concern for the issue jumped to 28 percent by 
April 1990. 
36 
Figure 14: "Federal Budget Deficit as Most Important Problem" 
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Since Bush did not talk specifically about the Balanced Budget Act of 1990 
during the time period for which this question was measured, it is hard to tell what caused 
the changes in public opinion. However, it is interesting that during the first part of his 
administration, when the economy was an issue for Bush, it was also an issue for the 
public, Yet when the president tinned his attention towards foreign policy in the Persian 
Gulf Crisis around January 1991, the public also turned its attention away fiom the deficit 
issue. 
Similar to the results I'rom the most important problem question, responses to the 
way Bush handled the deficit situation were also more positive at the beginning of Bush' s 
administration. In fact, his level of approval for the way he handled the deficit situation 
was highest in November 1989, shortly after the Balanced Budget Act passed. Perhaps 
this was because of his fiequency in going public, or perhaps it was due to factors like the 
public's positivity bias in evaluating its public officials. 
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Figure 15; "Approval of Way Bush is Handling Deficit Situation" 
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This graph shows that Bush was unable to maintain or increase public approval 
for his handling of the budget deficit throughout his administration. This slight increase 
in public approval indicated in March 1991 could possibly be part of the reaction to the 
United States' victory in the Persian Gulf Crisis. Because of the president's success in 
the conflict, he may have experienced a general increase in public approval across several 
issues. However, as indicated on the graph, this increase in approval was temporary and 
eventually dissolved as the conflict in the Persian Gulf grew more distant. Bush may 
have also experienced difficulty in maintaining public support near the end of his 
administration because the campaign of 1992 brought forth candidates who targeted 
Bush's economic policy. 
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Similar results are observed in response to the question concerning Bush's 
progress with the deficit probletn. Although Bush was never able to obtain a higher 
approval rating than disapproval rating, he did receive the most support directly after the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1990 passed. 
Figure 16: uHas Bush Made Progress With the Federal Budget Deficit?" 
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Like before, the increase in approval in March 1991 may have been the result of a 
general approval increase caused by the victory in the Persian Gulf Conflict. If this is the 
case, then the approval level shown for November 1990 probably more accurately 
represents Bush's long-term approval rating. Consequently, the results fiom this graph 
would provide further evidence that Bush was unable to maintain public support for his 
federal budget deficit policies. 
The results fiom each of these graphs indicate that Bush was relatively 
unsuccessful at maintaining support for his economic policies regarding the federal 
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budget deficit. However, the one question asked while Bush was going public for the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1990 generated more positive results. In a matter of three 
weeks, public approval for Bush's Balanced Budget Act nearly doubled. Figure 17 
reflects these results, 
Figure 17: "Do You Favor Bush's New Budget Act?" 
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This increase in public opinion corresponded with a very minor increase of three 
paragraphs in Bush's fiequency. It also occurred shortly before the bill passed and may 
therefore have been in response to an increase in media coverage. Regardless of the 
reason why public support increased between these two polls, these results alone make 
the president's attempts to obtain and maintain public support for his deficit policies 
seem successful. However, the other graphs show that his success in this area is short- 
lived and does not continue throughout the rest of his administration. 
Audience Type 
Contrary to my hypothesis, differences in audience types did not significantly 
affect public opinion on any question examined. Figures 18 and 19 provide examples of 
how audience type did not affect public opinion. These graphs compare changes in 
public support for going to war with Iraq to Bush's addresses to the press and public, 
respectively. Although changes in public opinion for every question asked were 
unaffected by the type of audience(s) Bush addressed, this question was selected to serve 
as an example because it is one in which Bush experienced both success and difficulty 
with changing public opinion. 
I chose to use addresses to the press and public in this example because the 
majority of the president's addresses were directed towards one of these audiences. In 
Figure 18, "press" is defined as the number of paragraphs that Bush spoke about the 
Persian Gulf Crisis with the intent of speaking only to reporters. Even though reporters 
were present at nearly every time he goes public, this graph only represents the addresses 
that Bush geared towards the press, specifically. 
Figure 19 examines the effect of addresses to the public on changes in public 
opinion. Similar to the addresses considered in Figure 18, Figure 19 includes only the 
addresses for which Bush intended to speak primarily to the general public. 
Figure 18: "Effect of Addresses to Press on Public Opinion" 
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Figure 19: "Effect of Addresses to Public on Public Opinion" 
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Because these graphs are nearly identical, their results are similar. For example, 
Figure 18 shows that addresses to the press did not affect public support for going to war 
with Iraq, Likewise, Figure 19 indicates that addresses to the public also did not affect 
public support, Although it appears that changes in public support and addresses to the 
press/public are related in the beginning of the graph, this trend does not continue. From 
the end of November 1990 to the end of February 1991, Bush's addresses to the 
press/public were minimal while public support continually increased. Likewise, by July 
1991 addresses to the press/public greatly increased while public support declined. 
As discussed before, public support on this issue may have changed in response to 
developments in the crisis. Nevertheless, at the very least these graphs show that 
presidential addresses to the press/public are not as influential at changing public opinion 
as changes in events. 
Discussion 
The results from this study show that President Bush's success at changing public 
opinion was mixed On one hand, he was mostly unsuccessful at obtaining public 
support for his policies and at increasing pub Vic approval of his performance on issues by 
going public. On the other hand, the results indicate that he was able to successfully 
increase the salience of all four issues by going public. 
Similarly, the trequency with which Bush spoke about an issue did not effect 
public opinion about his policies or performance, However, it did effect issue salience: 
the more Bush spoke about an issue, the more salient it became, In contrast to the effect 
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Bush' s frequency had on salience, the type of audiences he addressed did not affect 
public opinion at all. 
With the exception of nationwide addresses, every time Bush went public he was 
relatively unable to obtain support for his policies or increase approval of his 
performance. Yet results I'rom both the Persian Gulf Crisis and the War on Drugs suggest 
that his nationwide addresses caused some increases in public approval and support. 
These results seem to indicate that the president may be more successful at going public 
through nationwide addresses than through other types of addresses. 
Like the nationwide addresses, President Bush was also more successful at 
changing public opinion about general policies than specific ones. For example, the 
percentage of approval for the way Bush handled the drug problem was as high in the end 
of his administration as it was in the beginning. Additionally, his percentage of public 
approval on the drug issue was consistently higher than his percentage of public 
disapproval. In contrast, approval for the way Bush handled the federal deficit problem 
gradually declined during his administration and his percentage of public approval on the 
budget issue never surpassed his percentage of disapproval. 
Bush was also more successful at changing public opinion about foreign policy 
issues than domestic policy issues. For example, results fiom the Persian Gulf Crisis 
show that the magintude of increases in public approval were greater for this issue than 
for any of the other three issues. Additionally, results lrom the War on Drugs show that 
the percentage of public approval of Bush's performance fluctuated between 45 percent 
and 54 percent throughout his administration. This suggests that the president had 
difficulty maintaining support for this domestic policy. Finally, the president was least 
successful at obtaining support for the Balanced Budget Act of 1990. In fact, Bush was 
unable to ever obtain higher approval ratings than disapproval ratings for tus budget 
policies. 
Because it was easier for Bush to obtain public approval on general issues and 
foreign policy issues, he was most successful at obtaining support for his Persian Gulf 
Crisis policies. He was also relatively successful in obtaining support for his drug 
policies because of their generality, Bush was less successful at obtaining support for the 
North American Free Trade Agreement, partly because the issue was too complex and 
specific. Finally, Bush was least successful at obtaining and maintaining support for the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1990 because it was both a domestic and specific policy. 
Taken together, the results of this study indicate that a president will be able to go 
public more effectively and use their resources more efficiently through nationwide 
addresses than other kinds of addresses. Additionally, since the president will be more 
successful at obtaming public support for general policies than specific ones, he would be 
most successful at changing public opinion through nationwide addresses that focus on 
general policies. 
Finally, this study provides evidence that the president is generally unsuccessful 
at obtaining public support for his policies. However, it is possible that if Bush did not 
go public about these issues, public support for his policies and approval of his 
performance would have been much less than it was. Of course, because the president 
went public about these issues, it is impossible to measure how public opinion would 
have changed if he had never gone public. Additionally, some results irom this study 
imply that public opinion is more responsive to changes in events and circumstances than 
to presidential addresses. If this is nue, then presidents should try and change public 
opinion through spectacle rather than by going public. 
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